Wednesday, December 19, 2007

Heideggerian phenomenology has, as many of you are aware, earned something of a bad rap in recent years with the advent of post-structuralist phenomenological approaches to the hypertrophic anti-Degaussian question with its firm rooting in the Milesian school. Contemporary deontologists and ontologists have struggled, ever since, to reconcile Degaussian Heideggerianism with incipient but recipient post-structuralist approaches to the neurophenomenological correlates of indelible trepidation found in Hellenistic-era works such as those of Chrysippus. The thesis which I will seek to attempt to further, advance and present is that post-structural neurophenomenology is not inimical to the endemic epidemic of pan-optic frugality we see in those such as Mill and Korsgaard, but rather it is a neo-Charlestonian conception of time and liberty as having a post-ontological existence within the realm of supposition.

Now, you might be thinking: what does neo-Charlestonianism have to do with post-structural approaches to neurophenomenology, particularly as it pertains to the pertinent portions of Cartesian intuitionism? Cartesian intuitionism, as you'll recall, is committed to the view that Gladstonian democracy as adopted by Mitterrand is not occidental, but is oriental in its orientation towards the Orient. The answer is that recidivism, particularly as practised in antebellum homogenous corrigibility, is astonishingly adept in its explanatory propositional validity. With this Heideggerian recidivism, we are now endowed with an explanatory propositionality with which to thematize and problematize the operationalizability of time and liberty. Time and liberty, after all, are what allow for a consideration of Reaganonian economics as the infrared structural adjustment of regionalizing within non-central Africa, mutatis mutandis.

So far, so good, and we are left with just one last problem which stands as an obstacle obstructing our way towards securing the achievement of a neo-Charlestonian pedagogy as paradigmatic of our spatio-temporal rejoinder towards artistic mendaciousness. Adorno wrote that the art of freedom consists not in the possibility of hope, but in the hope of possibility. In other words, he says, crucial to the project of reviving an autonomous inception of Degaussian historicism is the task of upending existing notions of crude and validity. Therefore, it is valid to conclude that percipient views on the recidivism of anti-industrial neo-Charlestonians are not, in fact, pivotal to our earth-science model. Rather, implementization of neo-adjustment basing for the model suggested by Koskei, Korsgaard and Skokie will be an empirical inevitability.

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